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REPLY TO MASSIMO DELL’UTRI
hilary putnaM 
Massimo Dell’utri knows my work very well, and, indeed, he has translated some of it into italian. nevertheless the temptation is always present to interpret a 
philosopher in such a way as to bring him close to oneself, and i think that, in places, 
this is what Massimo is doing here. so, it seems to me that, in one respect, i am, in a 
way, being interpreted out of my actual position.
i still reject the position i called “metaphysical realism” in Reason, Truth and History, 
but i now think that i chose an unfortunate name for it. it was a mistake to use that 
particular term, because there are many kinds of “metaphysical realism”, not just one—
indeed, in one sense my present position (as opposed to the “internal realist” position 
i defended from 1976 to 1990) is a metaphysical realist one—for i am a realist in my 
metaphysics. nevertheless, i am not a “metaphysical realist” in the sense that i attacked 
in Reason, Truth and History. in “metaphysical realism”, in the sense i attached to the 
term there, there were two leading ideas: one was the idea of making a catalog of all the 
kinds of things there are, i.e. all the kinds of things we can quantify over, and the sec-
ond was that those things could be divided up into individuals and properties (or, in 
Quine’s case, individuals and classes). Both ideas still seem to me to be “pipe dreams”. 
Think about the number of things that we talk about nowadays that simply don’t fit in 
any of the classic categories. for example, what sort of an entity is a depression—in the 
economic sense of the word, not the psychological? What sort of an entity is a war? 
constantly, as our conceptual vocabularies enlarge, we find ourselves able to refer to 
more and more aspects of reality that we never referred to before. The idea of a cat-
egorical list of all the fundamental aspects of reality may have seemed like a possible 
task to an ambitious Greek in the fifth or forth century B.c., but i think that we should 
now recognize that it is tremendously overambitious. There’s no foreseeable possibility 
of exhausting all the fundamental aspects of reality in any list we can ever make. That 
is one point i want to make.
The other point is that “ontology” itself, in the sense that Quine has given that term, 
is an extremely problematic project. to suppose that all the different aspects of reality 
can be cut up into “individuals” and “predicates” in just one way is a fundamental mis-
take—a mistake from a realist point of view. The phenomenon i have called “equiva-
lent descriptions” (that is to say, the phenomenon of theories that if taken at face value 
clash, but in fact turn out to be intertranslatable) is widespread precisely in the funda-
mental science of physics, whose supposed “ontology” Quine so much admired. in fact 
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the physicists stumbled on the phenomenon quite independently of me, and they in-
vented the term “duality” for exactly what i call “equivalent descriptions”. i do believe 
in realism in the sense of believing that there is a real world out there, most of which is 
not of our own making (we are of course very much interested in the part that is of our 
making, but most of it isn’t of our making), and i believe that there is a truth about that 
world which is not of our making—in that sense i am a realist in my metaphysics. i do 
believe that true empirical statements about contingent reality are made true because 
they correctly represent aspects of reality. That’s objectivity and i am an objectivist. 
But the question “What does objectivity in the epistemic sense mean?” is a much more 
complicated one. “objectivity” has a number of senses; in particular it can refer for 
example to certain kinds of epistemic virtues, to certain ways of being detached, which 
are appropriate in certain contexts and not in others.
in fact, the key place where Massimo is really stating his position rather than mine oc-
curs when he says:
an intersubjective agreement of this kind shows what we can take as ‘objective’ 
about a given question, what we can say is ‘true’ or ‘false’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, and 
so forth, giving content to the notions of objectivity, truth and rightness. Thus, 
since these contents arise from the cognitive procedures by means of which we 
promote discussions, and do not therefore transcend the power of the human 
cognitive faculties, those notions reveal themselves as epistemic ones.
That is what i thought in my “internal realist” period, which i gave up in 1990, and so 
it is not what i think now. i do not think that the notion of truth is an epistemic notion. 
if it were an epistemic notion, then there couldn’t be truths that are unknowable. But 
there can be truths that are unknowable. i do not subscribe to the view that truth is an 
epistemic notion.
it simply isn’t true for example that peirce defined truth correctly. in several places 
i have stressed the deleterious effects of the copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. in The Quest for Certainty, Dewey argues that the real meaning of the theo-
retical statements in science is what they say about observables, and in support of that 
he cites the latest science, Bohr’s copenhagen interpretation. (he had a granddaughter 
who took a phD in theoretical physics in copenhagen, and he talked about that with 
her.) so, it doesn’t matter if Dewey gave up the word “metaphysics”; he held a meta-
physical view of truth, right to the end of his life. in fact, he held a metaphysical view 
of reality, i would say, because he had the strange view—as far as i can make it out—
that reality consists of qualities, but there is no knowledge of qualities. This is a clear 
example of the fact that the generalization “Whenever a philosopher says that meta-
physics is over, you can start looking for the bad metaphysics” is correct.
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i believe in a big world in which human sensations are a very small part, as opposed 
to the empiricist-cum-idealist picture that the real world is only a very small part of a 
reality consisting of certain patterns in human sensations. That has always seemed to 
me a crazy picture. and if there is a real world of which we are only a very small part, 
then surely there are a lot of truths about it that are not going to be verifiable by human 
beings. it could be, for example, that the sentence “There are no intelligent extraterres-
trials” is true—and if it’s true, it is very likely that we can never know that it is true. 
let me spell this out: suppose that there are no intelligent extraterrestrials. perhaps 
that is highly improbable. perhaps the probability is 99.999 that there are, somewhere 
in this big universe, intelligent extraterrestrials. But it is a logical consequence of the no-
tion of probability itself that if you say that the probability is 99.999 that there are intel-
ligent extraterrestrials, you are also saying that maybe there are none (with the prob-
ability 0.001). suppose then that there are no such extraterrestrials. since information 
cannot travel faster than light, most parts of the universe are sufficiently far away that 
causal signals from them showing that they contain no such extraterrestrials could 
never reach us. Thus it may be physically impossible for human beings ever to know 
the truth that intelligent extraterrestrials do not exist, if they don’t. so, for realists the 
idea that truth cannot outrun verifiability is unacceptable. i can see no justification for 
the identification of what is true with what is in principle verified or could in principle 
be verified. and once one says that truth outruns verifiability, then the idea that truth 
is epistemic is ruled out.
i would like to talk about just three more points touched on in Massimo’s paper. first, i 
did say once that we shouldn’t attach metaphysical weight to bivalence, but i was wrong 
to say that. (i think that i was overly impressed by something Wittgenstein said.) in 
general, i think statements are true or false unless they are vague. But apart from cases 
in which one can point to a relevant vagueness, perhaps a vagueness arising from a 
particular context of use, i don’t think one should reject bivalence. in particular, what 
i think we should say is that there are mathematical truths that outrun provability by 
human beings; that is, there is a fact of the matter as to the truth of mathematical state-
ments in many cases in which human beings are unable to ascertain that truth.
secondly, about the question “What is the difference between Quine’s position and 
mine regarding fallibilism”, Massimo writes—and this is correct for Quine but not 
for me—“common sense may be rejected as well (as every other part of our body of 
knowledge)”. Well, what i want to say is that part of my position is that there are state-
ments such that saying that they are false—even saying that they are possibly false—
has no presently intelligible sense. But i also maintain that in each particular case, the 
judgment that a statement is necessarily true is itself corrigible. in short, i believe—and 
have believed ever since i wrote “it ain’t necessarily so” and “The analytic and the 
synthetic”—that we need the notion of a revisable necessity, the notion of what i have 
called necessity relative to a body of knowledge. on revisability, Quine and i agreed, of 
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course, but his position failed to do justice to the difference between, say, arithmetical 
truths and empirical ones. 
finally, Massimo correctly emphasized in his paper that people could actually come to 
agreements through democratic and fallibilistic discussion—which i think is the Dew-
eyan successor to the a priori decisions of the philosophers. not that what results from 
democratic fallibilistic discussion would necessarily be true—it  can involve mistakes 
too. But to mimic what Winston churchill said about democracy, democratic fallibilis-
tic discussion, especially well-informed discussion, is the worst of all possible systems 
except for all those others that have actually been tried.
This brings us back to the question of objectivity —especially in ethics.
one of the familiar problems of moral philosophy is how to relate to humans who feel 
no obligations to the institution of morality. (it is not that one has a simple answer or 
the same answer in all cases.) But we often forget that one of the chief functions of 
morality is to enable us to resolve conflicts not with immoral people, but with other 
moral people. for me, it was the emphasis that stanley cavell put on that point in part 
Three of The Claim of Reason that i found novel, and that to a certain extent shifted my 
way of thinking about morality. We are all aware that there is a question of the moral 
individual versus the immoral individual, but we tend to downplay the question of 
moral people who have disagreements, even disagreements that are not going to have 
any resolution. as cavell puts it, there can be a rational argument which doesn’t end 
in agreement—the fact that an argument doesn’t lead to a conclusion that everyone 
agrees on doesn’t show that the argument was irrational.
Moreover, i think that one thing we cannot do is to show that the unethical person 
is irrational. if we take it as a constraint on the semantics of ethical language that it 
should be possible to show that the unethical person is irrational, then we will lose—
cognitivism will lose. showing such a thing is simply an unrealistic ambition. i think 
that it is certainly true that someone could be fully rational and not ethical. Thus i 
think it should not be part of the burden of any present day ethical cognitivist to try to 
pretend that there is ahistorical truth in ethics. Ethics is a human institution. it rests on 
human interests—it doesn’t rest on a transcendental principle. if we think of ethics as a 
human institution—and not in a metaphysical way, i.e. as something a priori—think of 
it as an institution which is the least violent way we have of resolving conflicts—then 
we may be able to see that ethics rests not on one fundamental principle, one funda-
mental interest, but on a set of interests, e.g. an interest in compassion, an interest in 
universality (ethics should apply to everyone), an interest in equality (equality before 
the ethical law, which is in large part something that came in with the constitutional 
revolutions in Europe in the 1840s). These are ideas that have a history and also pos-
sess wide appeal. Moreover, they are not ideas whose appeal affected only Europeans. 
The moment they reached china, they swept china; they swept to some extent Japan; 
they swept india. These are ideas that we have come to accept because of their wide 
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appeal. But if someone genuinely does not have these interests—if someone is not out 
to treat others as equals, not out to be compassionate, not out to obey the moral law, i 
can’t say that person is irrational. i can’t prove that he should behave differently—there 
is no argument that will prove to the bad man that if he is rational, he must become 
good, or at least sincerely agree that he ought to become good. That’s not what we can 
provide. We must not, as it were, have a magical view of rationality. i do, however, 
think that believing in the objectivity of ethics is believing that there is a fact of the 
matter—sometimes a fuzzy one, because reasonableness is a vague notion—as to what 
is reasonable to do to further the interests i mentioned. and if you ask “Would the 
world be better off if such and such a moral idea were adopted?”, very often it would 
be clear that everyone who has those moral interests at all would answer “yes”. in that 
sense morality is objective.
in sum, i think it is possible to have a kind of “moderate cognitivism” in ethics, which 
is fully compatible with naturalism, and which does not commit one in the ambitions 
of Kantian, or platonic ethics.
